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THE COMMON ENTERPRISE TEST: GEYTING
HORIZONTAL OR GOING VERTICAL IN
WALS v. FOX HILLS DEVELOPMENT
CORP.
I. INTRODUCTfION
[T]hose circuits that believe.., only "vertical commonality" is
required to create an investment contract would deem the combina-
tion of sale and rental agreement in this case an investment contract.'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Wals v. Fox
Hills Development Corp.2 serves as an important reminder of the split
in the jurisdictions on the definition of a "common enterprise." In the
seminal case of SEC v. W. . Howey,3 the U.S. Supreme Court defined
the term "investment contract" for purposes of the federal securities
acts as an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expec-
tation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others.4
However, in the forty years since Howey, the courts in applying
the test have been unable to agree on the second prong: what is a
"common enterprise?"5 The federal circuit court of appeals are di-
vided, the Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC") has hedged,
and the Supreme Court has avoided the issue,6 leaving commentators
clamoring for a swift resolution to what has been termed "the 'most
elusive factor' in the 'elusive definition' of a security."7
1. Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1017 (7th Cir. 1994).
2. Id.
3. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
4. Id. at 298-99; Wals v. Fox Hill Dev. Corp., 828 F. Supp. 623, 624 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
5. James D. Gordon, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory
for Defining Investment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 635.
6. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1017-18.
7. Gordon, supra note 5, at 635-36. In one article, referring to the inability of the courts to
define a "security," the authors called it "[o]ne of the notable intellectual failures of American
corporate law." 3 HAROLo S. BLOOMENTrAL, SEcuRrrIs AND FEDERAL CoR'oRATE LAW
§ 2.02 (1992) (quoting William J. Carney and Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a 'Security'; Georgia's
Struggle with the 'Risk Capital' Test, 30 EMORY LJ. 73 (1981), reprinted in 14 SEC L. REv. 503
(1982)).
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The circuits have split on whether the second prong of the Howey
test requires "vertical commonality" or "horizontal commonality."
Vertical commonality, the broader of the two, requires only that the
"fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the
efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third par-
ties."9 Horizontal commonality requires a pooling of interests, usually
combined with a pro rata sharing of profits.10
This Note reviews the definition of a "security" under the federal
securities acts and Howey's subsequent test for finding an "investment
contract." Furthermore, this Note examines the historical support for
the Seventh Circuit's requiring "horizonal commonality" and con-
cludes that such a requirement is not supported by the federal securi-
ties acts or Howey.11 Consequently, in this case, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals should have required only vertical commonality to
satisfy the "common enterprise" prong of the Howey test. Had it
done so, the court would have found that the purchase and rental
agreements constituted an "investment contract" subject to the fed-
eral securities acts. Therefore, the defendant's motion for summary
judgment should have been denied and the case remanded to the dis-
trict court for adjudication on the facts.
8. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits require horizontal commonality. See, e.g., Deck-
ebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc., 867 F2d 278, 282 (6th Cir. 1989); Stenger v. R.H. Love Gal-
leries, Inc., 741 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1984); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982). The Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits use the vertical
commonality test. See, eg., McGill v. American Land & Exploration Co., 776 F.2d 923, 925-26
(10th Cir. 1985); Villeneuve v. Advanced Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11th
Cir. 1983) (en banc); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 521-22 (5th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Central
Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit now accepts either
vertical or horizontal commonality. Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 566 (9th Cir. 1988). The
First and Fourth Circuits have declined to decide the issue, leaving their district courts split. See
Shawn H. Crook, Comment, What is a Common Enterprise? Horizontal and Vertical Commonal-
ity in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 CUMB. L. REv. 323, 333-40 (1989). Though not yet
expressed as a requirement, the Second Circuit appears to favor a horizontal commonality re-
quirement. See Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1994).
9. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 566 (emphasis omitted).
10. Id.
11. This Note does not intend to offer a comprehensive review of the historical evolution of
the definition of an "investment contract" nor a critical analysis of vertical or horizontal com-
monality. For such a review and analysis, see Gordon, supra note 5. Similarly, for a more com-
plete discussion of the split in the Federal Circuits, see Crook, supra note 8.
[Vol. 30:727
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts and Lower Court History
In 1990 the plaintiffs, Richard and Sandra Wals, purchased "week
5" of an apartment in the Fox Hills Golf Villas Condominium from
the developer and at the same time entered into a "flexible agree-
ment" with the developer whereby the plaintiffs could swap their
week in February for a week in the summer. 2 Under a supplement to
the flexible time agreement, called the "4-Share Rental Program," the
plaintiffs agreed not to occupy the apartment during the week in the
summer, but instead to allow the developer to rent it.'3 By participat-
ing in the 4-share program, plaintiffs were guaranteed $1,400 of rental
income for 1990, which was placed into an escrow account to offset
the monthly payments due under the land contract. 4 The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendants, in guaranteeing the 1990 rental income,
impliedly represented that they would be receiving similar rental in-
come in subsequent years.' 5 The Wals claimed that they were unso-
phisticated and inexperienced in the operation of income producing
properties.' 6 Further, they alleged that they purchased the time-share
as an investment and, had it not been for the guaranteed rental in-
come for 1990 and the prospect of similar receipts in subsequent
years, they would not have purchased the unit. 7
Since diversity of the parties did not exist, the District Court
questioned its jurisdiction to hear the matter.' Plaintiffs filed a mo-
tion for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that the
12. Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1017 (7th Cir. 1994).
13. Id.
14. Wals v. Fox Hill Dev. Corp., 828 F. Supp. 623, 624 (E.D. Wis. 1993). More generally,
under the agreements, the Wals would receive the rental minus the developer's fee of 30 percent.
Wals, 24 F.3d at 1017.
15. Wals, 828 F. Supp. at 624.
16. Id. At the time the wals entered into the time-share purchase, Richard Wals was a
programmer/analyst and his wife was an elementary school teacher. They lived approximately
90 miles from the Fox Hills condominiums. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The plaintiffs premised federal court jurisdiction on 15 U.S.C. § 771, claiming that
the offering and sale of the time-share, combined with the flexible time agreement and the rental
pool agreement, was an "offering" and "sale of an investment contract" within the meaning of
the Securities Act of 1933. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted state law claims seeking can-
cellation and rescission of the offer to purchase and the land contract, and for return of all
payments made under the land contract. Id. Thus, the threshold question to justify federal court
jurisdiction was whether there was a "security." Both the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals found that, as a matter of law, the purchase and associated agreements did not constitute
an investment contract, thus destroying plaintiffs' basis for federal court jurisdiction. Regarding
the asserted state law claims, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the federal court may decline to
1995]
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various contracts considered together constituted an investment con-
tract.19 The defendant responded with its own motion for summary
judgment.20 The District Court granted summary judgment for Fox
Hills, holding that the various time-share transactions between the
parties did not constitute an investment contract "because it is clear
from the record that horizontal commonality does not exist."''2
B. Issue
On appeal, the Wals again contended that the condominium time-
share purchase and the associated rental agreement converted the sale
of the condominium from a sale of real estate to a sale of an invest-
ment contract subject to the Securities Act of 1933.22 The Wals al-
leged that the developer was required and failed to register under the
Securities Act, thus entitling them to rescind the sale.23
I1. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. Securities Regulation
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and many
states' securities laws do not generally consider time-share interests to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims because the court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction.
19. Wals, 828 F. Supp. at 624.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 625. In particular, the District Court noted the deposition of the General Man-
ager of Fox Hills Development Corp.:
Q So every year, when they wanted to opt into the 4-Share rental program, they could
choose one of those four months, depending upon availability.
A Yes. First come first served. Everyone receives-we send out a lease back form
each year for those folks that want to put part or all or none or whatever into it. And
then they ask them what month would you like to come in to. And, again, depending
on the conventions, and whatever else, I mean it's a coin toss in your own mind which
one is going to be the best. I'm frank to admit I don't know until the bookings are
actually in. September might be the best one year, July might be best next year, and
whatever, depending on occupancy.Q And if you're lucky enough to have your specific unit you're assigned in a specific
month that you pick to be completely rented out, then you get all of the-you get all
the income that was generated for that unit for that week.
A Right. Correct. In other words, it's somewhat of a crap shoot, because you don't
come out the same. You know.
Q So the units are not pooled in a month or in a season, and then they take all the
gross income and split it up equally between-
A We did at one time, and we have changed that. They were never part of that.
Id.
22. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1017. The Securities Act is located at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
23. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1017 (citing 15 U.S.C § 771 (1988) (allowing recovery of consideration
paid for any security sold in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988))).
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be securities, but could characterize them as such if the time-share
interests were marketed emphasizing the investment potential of own-
ership.24 Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines a "secur-
ity" as "[a]ny note, stock... [or] ... investment contract .... ."I
While time-share interests are not clearly within the usual definition
of "stock," "note," "bond," "debenture," or "evidence of indebted-
ness," as set out in Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, they may be consid-
ered "securities" by reason of being "investment contracts" or
"instruments commonly known as securities. '2 6
In an effort to better define the applicability of federal securities
laws to the condominium market, the SEC stated that the offering of
condominium units in conjunction with any of the following would
cause the offering to be viewed as an offering of securities in the form
of an investment contract:2 7 (1) emphasizes the economic benefits to
be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter; (2) includes a
rental pool arrangement; or (3) materially restricts the ability of the
purchaser to rent or occupy the unit?8
24. Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, Interval Ownership and Vacation Club Options, C752 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 287, 300-01 (1992).
25. 15 U.S.C § 77b(1) (1988). The full text definition according to the Securities Act of
1933 is as follows:
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, trans-
ferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "se-
curity", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.
Id. § 77b(1).
The 1934 Securities Act defines a security in substantially the same manner except that it (1)
deletes the term "evidence of indebtedness;" (2) it excludes short-term "commercial paper;" and
(3) it uses a "slightly different approach in classifying oil and gas interests as -a security." 3
BLooMENmAT, supra note 7, § 2.02 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988)). The Senate report on
the 1934 Act makes clear that its definition of a security was intended to be "substantially the
same as in the Securities Act of 1933." Id.
26. Stubblefield, supra note 24, at 301.
27. Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1988). The reasoning and conclusions
set out in the SEC release should apply to time-shares. According to one securities law treatise,
"[e]ssentially the same analysis applicable to resort condominiums should apply to timesharing
... offerings." 2 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcurrriES REGULATON 970 (3d ed. 1989).
28. William J. Ohle, Note, Hocking v. Dubois: The Ninth Circuit Finds a Security in the
Secondary Resort Condominium Market, 27 WLLAmrE L. REv. 147, 153 (1991). Guidelines
as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or
Units in a Real Estate Development, Securities Act Release No. 33-5347, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1,049 (Jan. 4, 1973). The Release further stated, "[i]f the condominiums are not offered
1995]
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In SEC v. W. . Howey Co., the United States Supreme Court
long ago defined an "investment contract" under the federal securities
acts as:
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoters or a third party, it being immate-
rial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal
certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed
in the enterprise.29
Thus, under Howey, an investment contract consists of: (1) an invest-
ment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with the expectation
of profits produced by the efforts of others.3 ° The Howey opinion
stated that the term "investment contract" had been "broadly con-
strued by state courts so as to afford the investing public a full mea-
sure of protection. Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis
was placed upon economic reality."'31 The Court reasoned that its def-
inition "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is
capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes de-
vised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the prom-
ise of profits."32
Unfortunately, because neither the Court in Howey nor any sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision has defined the "common enter-
prise" prong of the Howey test, the federal courts have been left to
and sold with emphasis on the economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived from the mana-
gerial efforts of others, and assuming that no plan to avoid the registration requirements of the
Securities Act is involved, an owner of a condominium unit may, after purchasing his unit, enter
into a non-pooled rental arrangement with an agent not designated or required to be used as a
condition to the purchase, whether or not such agent is affiliated with the offeror, without caus-
ing a sale of a security to be involved in the sale of the unit." Id.
29. 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
30. Hocking, 839 F.2d at 564. The third prong of the original Howey test requiring profits to
be derived "solely" from the efforts of others was subtly changed in United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). In Forman, the Court stated that "[t]he touchstone is the
presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits
to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852. The Forman
Court acknowledged the changed language of the Howey test, but reasoned that "the word
'solely' should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment
contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition those
schemes which involve in substance, if not in form, securities." Id. at n.16 (quoting SEC v. Glenn
W. Tuer Enter., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973)).
31. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
32. Id. at 299. Interestingly, the Howey test has led courts to classify a wide variety of
exotic schemes as "investment contracts." See, e.g., Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir.
1979) (earthworms); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-85 (5th Cir. 1974)
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disagree.33 Indeed, the Supreme Court has avoided the opportunity
to resolve the definition of a common enterprise.34 In Mordaunt v.
Incomco, the Court denied certiorari on the commonality issue over
the objection of three justices.35
B. Defining a Common Enterprise
The courts have developed three approaches in answering the
question, "what constitutes a common enterprise?" Some courts re-
quire horizontal commonality, which focuses on the "horizontal" rela-
tionship among the investors in an enterprise. 36 Other courts hold
that a common enterprise can exist by virtue of either narrow or
broad vertical commonality, which focuses on the "vertical" relation-
ship between the investor and the promoter.37
The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that the exist-
ence of a common enterprise under the Howey test can be established
by a showing of horizontal commonality: the tying of each investor's
fortunes to those "of the other investors by the pooling of assets, usu-
ally combined with the pro rata distribution of profits."38 Thus, in a
common enterprise evidenced by horizontal commonality, the individ-
ual investor's fortunes depend on the profitability of the whole.39
The Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the
view that only vertical commonality is necessary to establish the exist-
ence of a common enterprise.4 ° In an enterprise marked by vertical
commonality, it is not necessary that the investor's fortunes rise and
fall together; a pro rata sharing of profits and losses is not required.41
The vertical commonality test defines a common enterprise as "one in
33. Crook, supra note 8, at 325.
34. Gordon, supra note 5, at 642.
35. 469 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1985) (White, J., dissenting, urged the Court to settle the question
"[i]n light of the clear and significant split in the Circuits.. ."). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Brennan joined Justice White's dissent. Id. at 1115.
36. Gordon, supra note 5, at 640.
37. Gordon, supra note 5, at 641.
38. Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994).
39. Id. The court went on to quote Hart v. Pulte Homes of Michigan Corp., 735 F.2d 1001,
1004 (6th Cir. 1984): "Horizontal commonality ties the fortunes of each investor in a pool of
investors to the success of the overall venture. In fact, a finding of horizontal commonality
requires a sharing or pooling of funds." Id.
"Pooling" has been interpreted to refer to an arrangement whereby the account consti-
tutes a single unit of a larger investment enterprise in which units are sold to different
investors and the profitability of each unit depends on the profitability of the invest-
ment enterprise as a whole.
Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
40. Gordon, supra note 5, at 641 n.42.
41. Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
1995]
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which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent
upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of
third parties."'42
Under the rubric, vertical commonality, two distinct kinds have
been identified.43 First, under the narrow view, the success or failure
of the manager must correlate with the individual investor's profit or
loss." Stated another way, "the manager's fortunes must rise and fall
with those of the investor.""5 Second, the broad view of vertical com-
monality simply requires that the fortunes of the investors be linked to
the efforts of the promoter."6 In employing this approach, "the critical
inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the investments collec-
tively is essentially dependent on promoter expertise.""47
IV. DECISION
In Wals v. Fox Hills Development Corp.,8 the court found no hor-
izontal commonality, "that is, a pooling of interests not only between
the developer or promoter and each individual 'investor' but also
42. Gordon, supra note 5, at 641 (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Trner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d
476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973)).
43. Revak, 18 F.3d at 87.
44. Gordon, supra note 5, at 641 (citing Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir.
1978)).
45. Gordon, supra note 5, at 641 (citing Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225,
1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
46. Revak, 18 F.3d at 88. The broad approach to commonality has been criticized by some
courts that argue it "essentially eliminates the 'common enterprise' prong of the Howey test
because the only inquiry required becomes whether the success or failure of the investment is
dependent upon the promoter's efforts, which is also the third prong of the Howey test." Crook,
supra note 8, at 331 n.41 (quoting Kaplan v. Shapiro, 655 F. Supp. 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)); see
also Copeland v. Hill, 680 F. Supp. 466,468 (D. Mass. 1988) (citing Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook &
Co., 528 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mass. 1981) ("the broad vertical commonality merges the second element
of the Howey test with the third element, thus eliminating one prong")).
The Fifth Circuit has recognized the criticism that under its relaxed vertical commonality
requirement "the second and third prongs of the Howey test may in some cases overlap to a
significant degree." Jayne E. Zanglein, Securities Laws, 22 TEx. TEcH L. Rnv. 685,705 (quoting
Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 141 (5th Cir. 1989)). In response to the criticism, the
Fifth Circuit Court stated:
We are not convinced that it would be desirable to adopt a rigid requirement that prof-
its and losses be shared on a pro rata basis among investors, or that the promoter's
fortunes correlate directly to the profits and losses of investors. Howey sought to estab-
lish a standard which would "embod[y] a flexible rather than a static principle, one that
is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." It may be that in
declining to adopt the rigid formulae of other circuits, our standard comports more
fully with Howey's desire to fulfill the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws.
Id. (quoting Long, 881 F.2d at 141-42) (citation omitted).
47. Gordon, supra note 5, at 642 (quoting SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d
516, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974)).
48. 24 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1994).
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among the 'investors."' 49 Thus, the condominium time-share purchase
and rental agreement was not an investment contract.50 The court
noted that the rental agreements connoted a pooling of weeks because
the Wals chose their summer swap week from a "pool" of available
weeks, but concluded there was no sharing of profits, which is essen-
tial to horizontal commonality.5
1
In affirming the District Court's refusal to recognize vertical com-
monality as satisfying the "common enterprise" prong of the Howey
test, the Court of Appeals noted that the Supreme Court has ducked
the issue, and the SEC has hedged.52 The court further concluded that
requiring horizontal commonality better comported with the purpose
of the Securities Act of 1933.53 In the court's view, the statutory lan-
guage "suggests that the term 'investment contract' has the limited
purpose of identifying unconventional instruments that have the es-
sential properties of a debt or equity security."54 In that context, the
court noted that a share of stock is an undivided interest in an enter-
prise entitling the owner to a pro rata share of the profits.55 In con-
trast, the court reasoned, the owner of a condominium does not own
an undivided share of the building.56 Rather, the condominium owner
owns only his condominium, and if it is rented out on his behalf by the
developer, he receives only the rental on that unit, not an undivided
share of the total rentals of all the rented units. 7
V. ANALYSIS OF WALS v. Fox HLLS
The decision in Wals is important because it is a significant re-
minder of the split in the jurisdictions on the definition of a "common
enterprise." The court acknowledged the split, but went on to adhere
strictly to the "horizontal commonality" test of a common
enterprise.58
49. Id. at 1018.
50. Id. at 1019.
51. Id. The appellate court stated that "they did not receive an undivided share of some
pool of rentals or profits. They received the rental on a single apartment, albeit one not owned
by them (for it was not their week)." Id.




56. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1018.
57. Id.
58. Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1994).
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While the Court of Appeals was perhaps correct about the
Supreme Court and the SEC, it was wrong in its suggestion that hori-
zontal commonality better comported with the 1933 Act and wrong in
its decision in this case.
A. Applicability of SEC Release 5347
The Court of Appeals' entire analysis as to the applicability of
Securities Act Release No. 5347 "Guidelines as to the Applicability of
the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sale of Condominiums or
Units in a Real Estate Development," was to suggest that "the SEC
has hedged."5 9 However, another federal court saw Release No. 5347
as stating "unequivocally that it will view a condominium as a security
if it is offered with any one of three specified rental arrangements. '60
The three types of rental arrangements the SEC specified as caus-
ing the offering to be viewed as an investment contract are where the
offer: (1) emphasizes the economic benefits to be derived from the
managerial efforts of the promoter; (2) includes a rental pool arrange-
ment; or (3) materially restricts the ability of the purchaser to rent or
occupy the unit.6 1 In Wals, it is clear that the second and third SEC-
specified rental arrangements are not present. Because the rental ar-
rangement in Fox Hills did not combine the rents received and the
expenses attributable to all units, and remit the proceeds to the inves-
tors on a pro rata basis, it did not constitute a rental pool as contem-
plated by the SEC release.62 In addition, because the "flexible time"
and "4-Share" agreements were optional, the Wals were not materi-
ally restricted in their use of the unit.
However, the first specified rental arrangement, the so-called
"economic emphasis test,"63 may arguably apply in the instant case.
59. Id. at 1018.
60. Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 565 (9th Cir. 1988).
61. Ohle, supra note 28, at 153.
62. The SEC Release stated:
lypically, the rental pool is a device whereby the promoter or a third party undertakes
to rent the unit on behalf of the actual owner during that period of time when the unit
is not in use by the owner. The rents received and the expenses attributable to rental of
all the units in the project are combined and the individual owner receives a ratable
share of the rental proceeds regardless of whether his individual unit was actually
rented.
SEC Release No. 33-5347, supra note 28.
63. Ohle, supra note 28, at 154. The SEC probably relied on the language of SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943), stating that it is "not inappropriate that promot-
ers' offerings be judged as being what they were represented to be." However, it should be
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Under this test, an investment contract will be found if "[the] condo-
.iius... with a[ny] rental arrangement[s or similar service],... are
offered and sold... [with] emphasi[s on] the economic benefits to the
purchaser to be derived from the managerial efforts of the promoter
... [from the rental of the units]." 6 Applying this approach, the court
should generally look to the terms of the offer, the distribution plan,
and the economic inducements.65 Apparently, the Court of Appeals
in Wals found the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant impliedly repre-
sented future rental income insufficient to satisfy the economic reali-
ties test of Release No. 5347, or perhaps the court failed to even
consider the Release.
Whatever the reason, the plain language of Release No. 5347 con-
cerning the first rental arrangement, and the support of Hocking when
combined with the facts in the instant case, suggests that the Court of
Appeals could have reversed the district court's grant of defendant's
motion for summary judgment.66 For purposes of summary judgment,
the Wals' allegation that the defendant represented the receipt of
rental income for subsequent years should be accepted. That fact es-
tablishes that Fox Hills offered the purchase and rental agreements
which emphasized the economic benefits of the purchase, and thereby
fell under the first rental arrangement specified by SEC Release No.
5347. Consequently, in applying the economic emphasis test, Fox
Hills' offer can arguably be viewed as offering the Wals an investment
contract.
However, the reading of Release No. 5347 by the Hocking court
may be overly broad with respect to the "economic emphasis test. 67
Generally, in considering condominiums and other potential invest-
ment contracts, courts have limited the use of the economic emphasis
test to the third element of Howey.68 Indeed, it has been suggested
that the economic emphasis test, as used by the SEC and federal
courts, is simply one of many factors to be considered when determin-
ing if a given offer satisfies the last element of the Howey test.69 This
reading of the first rental arrangement specified by Release No. 5347
64. SEC Release No. 33-5347, supra note 28.
65. Robert B. Brannen, Jr., Comment, The Economic Realities of Condominium Registra-
tion Under the Securities Act of 1933, 19 GA. L. Rnv. 747, 759 (1985).
66. "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the party against whom
summary judgment has been entered is to be believed." Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18 F.3d 81,
84 (2d Cir. 1994).
67. See Ohle, supra note 28, at 154-55.
68. Ohle, supra note 28, at 154-55.
69. Brannen, supra note 65, at 769.
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is probably better. It is doubtful that the economic emphasis test was
intended to displace a Howey analysis. Rather, it was likely offered as
one factor courts should consider in determining whether an offer sat-
isfies the last element in Howey.70
Thus, even though the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not
specifically address the applicability of SEC Release No. 5347 in the
instant case, it likely concluded that Release No. 5347 alone was not
determinative on the existence of an investment contract. Conse-
quently, the Court proceeded to apply the Howey test, requiring hori-
zontal commonality for the "common enterprise" prong of that test.
B. The Horizontal Commonality Requirement
1. Horizontal Commonality and the Securities Act of 1933
"The primary policy of the federal securities acts is to protect in-
vestors through disclosure. ' 71 Congress broadly defined the term "se-
curity" in the 1993 Act in order to protect the public by preventing
crooked promoters from eluding the provisions of the securities laws
through "countless and variable schemes. '72 "Congress cast ['secur-
ity'] 'in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within
that definition the many types of instruments that in our commercial
world fall within the ordinary concept of a security."' 73
The remedial purpose of the 1933 Act was to "prevent further
exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent, and
worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and
true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise,
seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition af-
forded by dishonest securities offered to the public through crooked
promotion." 74 By including the term "investment contract," the 1933
Act provided for securities of a more variable character.75
70. See Ohle, supra note 28, at 154-55. The SEC likely included the economic emphasis test
in Release No. 5347 to act as a catchall to prevent circumvention of the release. However, in
adding the first rental arrangement provision in Release No. 5347, the SEC "sacrificed clarity in
favor of investor protection." Brannen, supra note 65, at 759-60.
71. Gordon, supra note 5, at 659.
72. Hocking v. Dubois, 839 F.2d 560, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946)). The Hocking court noted that the sections defining the term
"security" in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were substan-
tially identical. Id. at 563.
73. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. pt.1, at 11 (1933)).
74. Id. at 564 n.3 (quoting S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933)).
75. Howey, 328 U.S. at 297. The Supreme Court noted in 1943 that the term "security"
included "by name or description many documents in which there is common trading for specu-
lation or investment.' Some, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are pretty much standardized and
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State courts took the initiative to define the term "investment
contract."76 Although state laws had failed to define the term, it was
broadly construed to afford the investing public full protection.77
"Form was disregarded for substance and emphasis was placed upon
economic reality."78 Thus, an investment contract was construed to
mean a contract or scheme for "the placing of capital or laying out of
money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment. '79
In Howey, Justice Murphy suggested that state courts should uni-
formly apply this definition where individuals are led to invest in a
common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit
solely through the efforts of another.80 In addition, Justice Murphy
concluded that by bringing the term investment contract within the
scope of section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, "Congress was using a term the
meaning of which had been crystallized by this prior judicial interpre-
tation. It is therefore reasonable to attach that meaning to the term as
used by Congress, especially since such a definition is consistent with
the statutory aims.""1
Justice Murphy's analysis is flawed because after suggesting Con-
gress intended to use the Gopher Tire' definition of an investment
contract (i.e., a contract or scheme for "the placing of capital or laying
out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment"), he proceeded to announce a different test.8 3  In
Howey, he wrote: "In other words, an investment contract for pur-
poses of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led
the name alone carries well settled meaning. Others are of more variable character and were
necessarily designated by more descriptive terms, such as. . . 'investment contract,' and 'in gen-
eral any interest or instrument commonly known as a security."' 3 BLooMENTRAL, supra note 7,
at 2.11 to .12 (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943)).
76. Gordon, supra note 5, at 637. The term "investment contract" originated in the state
securities acts ("blue sky laws") enacted before the federal securities acts. The first state securi-
ties act was enacted by Kansas in 1911. The statutes are called "blue sky laws" because they
were directed at speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky.
Id. at 637 n.14.
77. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298.
78. Id.




82. Gopher ire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. at 937.
83. Gordon, supra note 5, at 648.
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to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party."84
However, none of the state cases relied on by Justice Murphy had
announced the Howey test. Rather, the test appears to be the product
of Justice Murphy's case synthesis.85 Moreover, none of the state
cases cited in Howey even used the term "common enterprise. '86
Consequently, the state cases cited in Howey offer little insight into
Justice Murphy's meaning of the term "common enterprise. ' 87 In-
deed, the state cases cited actually provide a strong argument against
the requirement of horizontal commonality.8 8 In six of the seven state
cases, investment contracts were found and in three of those six, hori-
zontal commonality was absent.8 9
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's belief that a horizontal com-
monality requirement better comported with the purpose of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 appears to be misguided. The court agreed that
the 1933 Act is a disclosure statute, but it further reasoned that the
disclosure requirement only makes sense if investors obtain the same
thing, namely an undivided share in the same pool of assets and prof-
its.90 However, form of ownership of an enterprise and the manner of
dividing profits are largely formal distinctions.91 As explained by
Howey in defining the term investment contract, the pre-1933 Act
"blue sky" cases made clear that "[f]orm was disregarded for sub-
stance and emphasis was placed on economic reality."92
In Wals, the court rigidly adhered to the horizontal commonality
test, requiring a pooling of profits.93 In doing so, it focused on factors
largely unrelated to the policy of the Securities Acts and effectively
elevated form over substance.94 The Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Wals should have followed the Howey command that "[t]he
84. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
85. Gordon, supra note 5, at 649.
86. Gordon, supra note 5, at 651. The state cases cited which used the terms "enterprise"
and "common operation" are ambiguous. Id. at 651-52.
87. Gordon, supra note 5, at 652.
88. Gordon, supra note 5, at 652.
89. Gordon, supra note 5, at 652. Horizontal commonality was not present in Prohaska v.
Hemmer-Miller Dev. Co., 256 111. App. 331 (1930); State v. Evans, 191 N.W. 425 (Minn. 1922); or
Steven v. Liberty Packing Corp., 161 A. 193 (N.J. 1932). Horizontal commonality was present in
Moore v. Stella, 127 P.2d 300 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942); People v. White, 12 P.2d 1078 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1932); and State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937 (Minn. 1920).
90. Wals v. Fox Hills Dev. Corp., 24 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1994).
91. Gordon, supra note 5, at 660-61.
92. Gordon, supra note 5, at 661 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 298)).
93. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1019.
94. Gordon, supra note 5, at 662.
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statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be
thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae."95
2. Horizontal Commonality and Howey
In requiring horizontal commonality to satisfy the "common en-
terprise" prong of the Howey test, the Seventh Circuit read Howey to
require that investors pool their investments and receive pro rata
profits. 96 However, Howey is susceptible to an alternative reading.97
Recall that in Howey the seller offered investors tracts in a citrus
grove along with an optional ten-year service contract under which
the seller would jointly cultivate the groves and harvest and market
the fruit.98 Thus, the investments unquestionably involved vertical
commonality.99 However, horizontal commonality was not implicated
in Howey, "because each investor individually owned a specific tract
of land."' 0 Indeed, in hearing Howey, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals noted that "[a]ll sales have been an out-right sale of a definitely
identified tract of land." 10 1 When the Supreme Court considered
Howey, it noted that the produce was pooled,10 2 but it likely meant
that produce was put together for marketing purposes.10 3 However,
that is not what is generally intended by the term "pooling" in the
horizontal commonality testY°4
Moreover, there was no pro rata sharing or pooling of profits in
Howey.'05 The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he company is account-
able only for an allocation of the net profits based upon a check made
at the time of picking.' 0 6 More persuasively, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated:
In no instance has there been a sale of a right to share with others in
the profits of land held in common with the defendant Companies
or others.... In the care of each grove, as in the yield of the fruit,
the cost of the care and the proceeds of the fruit may be, and are,
95. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
96. Wals, 828 F. Supp. at 625.
97. Gordon, supra note 5, at 645; see also, Jerry C. Bonnett, How Common Is a 'Common
Enterprise'?, 1974 Amiz. ST. L.J. 339, 349-50.
98. Howey, 328 U.S. at 295-96.
99. Gordon, supra note 5, at 645.
100. Gordon, supra note 5, at 645.
101. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714,716 n.5 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
102. Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.
103. Gordon, supra note 5, at 645.
104. Gordon, supra note 5, at 645.
105. Gordon, supra note 5, at 645.
106. Howey, 328 U.S. at 296.
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definitely and distinctly accounted for with respect to the specific
property owned by the individual.10 7
Thus, it appears clear that while the profits of the entire Howey
enterprise were to be divided (based on the selling of the pooled pro-
duce), each individual investor's return was based on the production
from his own specific tract of land. 08 Notwithstanding those facts,
however, the Supreme Court in Howey found an investment contract.
That makes it all the more surprising that some courts require a pro
rata sharing of profits and find no common enterprise if each inves-
tor's return depends on the income from his own asset.'0 9
C. Wals Revisited
Because the requirement of horizontal commonality appears un-
related to the purposes of the Securities Act" 0 and the seminal case
defining the term "investment contract" arguably did not involve hori-
zontal commonality,"' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should
recognize vertical commonality as satisfying the "common enterprise"
prong of the Howey test. If vertical commonality were applied in
Wals, the decision appears to be an easy one. As the Court of Ap-
peals noted, referring to the supplemental rental agreement,
the resulting division of rental income makes the developer and the
condominium owner coventurers in a profit-making activity, im-
parting to the condominium interest itself the character of an invest-
ment for profit ... those circuits that believe ... only "vertical
commonality" is required to create an investment contract would
deem the combination of sale and rental agreement in this case an
investment contract.112
In addition, simply comparing the facts in Wals to those in Howey
strongly suggests that an investment contract should be found in the
instant case. Like the investor's differentiated assets in Howey,113 in
107. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 715-16 n.5 (5th Cir. 1945). There was a real
disparity in citrus production among the individual tracts of land since purchasers could buy
tracts with trees of different maturities. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440,441 (S.D. Fla.),
affd, 151 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Indeed, of 51 sales involving
195.26 acres, eight of those sales were of non-bearing trees totaling 103.21 acres, and 43 were
sales of bearing trees totaling 92.05 acres. Howey, 151 F.2d at 715-16 n.5.
108. Gordon, supra note 5, at 645. These independent returns were one reason the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that Howey did not involve a security. Id. at 645-46.
109. Gordon, supra note 5, at 646.
110. See discussion supra part V.B.1.
111. See discussion supra part V.B.2.
112. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1017.
113. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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Wals, the plaintiffs' investment was in a specific time slice of a specific
apartment whose physical and temporal characteristics (including
price) differed from those of the other units." 4 Similarly, like the
pooling of produce in Howey,n 5 the pooling of weeks in Wals1 1 6 does
not satisfy the requirements of horizontal commonality.117 Finally,
like in Howey where there was no pro rata sharing or pooling of prof-
its,"1 the investors in defendant's time-shares "did not receive an un-
divided share of some pool of rentals or profits. They received the
rental on a single apartment ... "119
Moreover, in Howey, the citrus grove investment opportunity was
offered to persons residing in distant localities, who lacked the neces-
sary equipment and experience to cultivate, harvest, and market the
produce.2 0 The Court noted that such persons "have no desire to
occupy the land or to develop it themselves; they are attracted solely
by the prospects of a return on their investment.' 121 Further, the
Court observed that the individual tracts only gained utility as a citrus
grove when developed and cultivated as components of a larger
area."2 Thus, the Court in Howey reasoned, "[a] common enterprise
managed by respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and
equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their
paramount aim of a return on their investments."' 23
In Wals, the plaintiffs, for purposes of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, were residents of a distant locality, living some 90
miles from the condominium project.'A They were unsophisticated
and inexperienced in the ownership and operation of income produc-
ing properties,'2 intended not to occupy the time-share, 26 and
purchased the time-share as an investment, for the guaranteed rental
114. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1019.
115. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
116. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1019.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
119. WaLs, 24 F.3d at 1019. The court went on to say, "Their return was tied to another
space-time slice with its own unique characteristics. Every week of every apartment was a differ-
ent product." Id.
120. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299-300.
121. Id. at 300.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Wals, 828 F. Supp. at 624.
125. Id.
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income for 1990 and the prospect of similar receipts in future years. 127
Additionally, it is reasonable to argue that, like the tracts of land in
the Howey citrus groves, the individual Fox Hills time-shares only
gained utility as a recreational golf course condominium project 128
when marketed as part of a larger enterprise.
Thus, not only is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's require-
ment of horizontal commonality misguided, viewed against the pur-
poses of the federal securities acts, but its decision in Wals (so
factually similar to Howey), exposes the Seventh Circuit's "form over
substance" approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' decision in Wals exposes again the signifi-
cant split in the federal courts on the definition of a "common enter-
prise," and illustrates the need for the Supreme Court to take a
definitive position. The court in Wals required horizontal commonal-
ity to satisfy the "common enterprise' prong of the Howey test. How-
ever, the horizontal commonality requirement does not harmonize
well with the remedial purposes of the federal securities laws or
Howey. The federal securities acts defined the term "security"
broadly to afford the widest possible protection to the investing pub-
lic. In seeking to fulfill the remedial purposes of the federal securities
laws, Howey declined to adopt a rigid formula, instead setting out a
flexible approach. As the result in Wals illustrates, the horizontal
commonality requirement is entirely too rigid and ultimately elevates
form over substance.
Jonathan E. Shook
127. Wals, 828 F. Supp. at 624.
128. Wals, 24 F.3d at 1017. Also, recall the deposition of the Fox Hills General Manager who
spoke of "conventions, and whatever else" and "bookings," which connotes the need for a large
scale, sophisticated marketing effort. Something quite arguably beyond the abilities of individ-
ual time-share investors like the Wals. See supra note 21.
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